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Book Reviews 
The Constitution Between Friends 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS PoLmCAL PRO-
CESS. By Louis Fisher. t Princeton: Princeton Uuiversity Press, 
1988. Pp. x, 306. $35.00 cloth, $12.95 paperback.t 
Reviewed by Neal Devins* 
I. Introduction 
In a recent survey, six out of ten respondents claimed that they view 
the Supreme Court as the ultimate constitutional arbiter. 1 Newspaper 
coverage of this survey simply noted that these six were "correct."2 
Two years ago, then United States Attorney General Edwin Meese 
sparked controversy by arguing that Supreme Court decisions are not 
"binding on all persons and parts of government henceforth and forever-
more. " 3 For New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis, this assertion 
was an invitation to anarchy.4 
The reaction to the Meese speech and the reporting of the constitu-
tional survey both reflect the view that Supreme Court interpretations 
control the Constitution's application. This perception, however, is 
overly parochial and ultimately shortsighted. Granted, disrespect for 
Court interpretations by the elected branches and the states is destabi-
lizing and therefore to be avoided. 5 But one cannot trace constitutional 
decision making solely to the efforts of nine individuals working in isola-
t Specialist, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
t Hereinafter cited by page number only. 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; 
Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William and Mary. The author would 
like to thank Rod Smolla for commenting on a previous draft. 
1. Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987, at Al3, col. 1. 
2. Id. 
3. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987). For a summation of 
the controversy and a partial defense of Meese, see Levinson, Could Meese Be Right this Time?, 243 
NATION 689 (1986). 
4. Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23, col. 1. 
5. See Greenawalt, Constitutional Decisions and the Supreme Law, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 145, 
146-49 (1987); Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 
749-53 (1988). 
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tion. Other parts of government both interpret the Constitution and in-
fluence the judiciary. 
The above proposition is hardly novel. A long list of books and 
articles speak to nonjudic:ial constitutional decision making. 6 A recent 
and worthwhile addition to this list is Louis Fisher's Constitutional Dia-
logues: Interpretation as Political Process. 
II. The Character of Three-Branch Interpretation 
Fisher proposes to show that constitutional law "is a process in 
which all three branches converge and interact ... [with] [i]mportant 
contributions also com[ing] from the states and the general public."7 
Fisher succeeds admirably at this task, resting his case on hard evidence 
that falls into at least thrt:e categories. 
First, Fisher notes that numerous powers lodged in the elected 
branches check judicial e:x egesis. These powers include the appointment 
and confirmation of judges, 8 the regulation of federal court jurisdiction,9 
and the allocation of judicial salaries and resources.10 Second, Fisher 
points out that the elected branches play a critical role in constitutional 
interpretation. Arguments before the Court are frequently those of the 
Solicitor General and congressional litigants.11 More significantly, the 
Court's use of threshold justiciability and political question barriers12 
often gives the elected branches sole responsibility for ensuring that their 
own actions conform to constitutional norms. Finally, Fisher recognizes 
that the judiciary engage~. in constitutional dialogue by encouraging the 
elected branches to clarify judicial action through legislation or 
regulation. 13 
In that commentators have discussed these various phenomena else-
where, 14 Fisher's book is not pathbreaking. What distinguishes this book 
is its thoroughness and evenhandedness. Fisher means to illuminate the 
current arrangement rather than argue the arrangement's propriety, suc-
cess, or failure. 
Fisher chronicles the: various elements of his proof with the meticu-
6. For recent books on the · ssue of nonjudicial interpretation, see generally S. BARBER, ON 
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS n984); C. JOHNSON & B. CANON, JUDICIAL POLIDCS: IMPLE-
MENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER (1986). 
7. P. 3. 
8. See pp. 135-43. 
9. See pp. 215-21. 
10. See pp. 149-52. 
11. See pp. 24-36. 
12. See pp. 85-118. 
13. See pp. 247-70. 
14. Fisher identifies these works in his extensive list of suggested reading. Pp. 281-90. 
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lousness of a scientist testing a hypothesis. For example, he divides his 
chapter on threshold requirements into units on adverseness, advisory 
opinions, standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions. Each 
unit makes the same point. "If the judiciary is unprepared or unwilling 
to decide an issue, mootness [as well as standing, adverseness, and other 
similar rules are] one avenue of escape."15 "When the judiciary is ready 
to decide an issue, 'mootness' [as well as standing, adverseness, and other 
similar rules] will not stand in its way."16 Furthermore, Fisher applies 
the same methodology of comparing and contrasting case facts and hold-
ings in each unit. He then distills the accumulated evidence into his cen-
tral thesis: that threshold requirements "ration scarce judicial resources 
.... Judges invoke [them] to promote the adversary system, preserve 
public support, avoid conflicts with other branches of government, and 
provide flexibility of action for the judiciary."17 
Although Fisher's methodology lacks drama, it is effective and effi-
cient. He constantly reinforces his central thesis with mini-units packed 
with salient information about three-branch interpretation. In addition 
to his discussion of threshold requirements, Fisher's stockpile of topics 
includes non-article III courts; judicial appointments, removal, and com-
pensation; lobbying by elected officials and interest groups in the courts, 
and lobbying by judges outside of the courts; the certiorari decision; the 
removal of federal court jurisdiction; court packing; federal-state court 
relations; the implementation of court orders; and court-invited constitu-
tional interpretation by Congress. For those accustomed either to more 
deliberate explication or to more leisurely discussion of a subject, the 
book's never-ending flow of information operates like the Chinese water 
torture. After a couple of chapters, you are ready to concede Fisher's 
point. By book's end, you have long passed the point of capitulating.1s 
Despite being fact-heavy, Constitutional Dialogues is far from bor-
ing. Although occasionally bogged down by unnecessary detail, 19 the 
book is chock full of anecdotes that add life to Fisher's explorations. The 
15. P. 102. 
16. P. 103. 
17. P. 85. 
18. An added virtue of this approach is that one ean use Fisher's book as a general reference. 
Indeed, the book functions magnificently as a reference. The chapters are organized around discrete 
subjects, and the index is complete and accessible. Moreover, the chapter units are well documented 
and clearly written. Fisher also provides excellent bibliographic information. 
19. For example, the book details such topics as the Court's caseload burden and bureaucratic 
rules goveruing Supreme Court procedures. See generally pp. 162-99 (chapter on Supreme Court 
decision making). The book also devotes a chapter to the evolution of judicial review, a concern only 
tangentially related to constitutional dialogues. See pp. 44-84. 
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author places decisions suc:h as Ex parte McCardle,20 Buck v. Bell,21 and 
the Steel Seizure Case 22 in their social contexts. He provides an histori-
cal backdrop to efforts by the Justices to lobby Congress,23 discusses ex-
amples of how politics plays a role in case assignments,24 and charts the 
rise of legislators' attempt8 to advance their policy arguments.25 Indeed, 
Fisher is remarkably adept at enlivening both well-known topics with 
little-known facts and well-known subjects with little-known topics.26 
Fisher's use of case studies to substantiate the book's central argu-
ments also invigorates Constitutional Dialogues. Standing out among 
these tales are Fisher's descriptions of the legislative reactions to fourth 
amendment case law and 1:he Supreme Court's rejection of the legislative 
veto in INS v. Chadha.21 
The Chadha discussion highlights the need for Supreme Court sensi-
tivity to political realities. Characterizing the legislative veto as a "clas-
sic quid pro quo" betwe«~n legislature and executive,28 Fisher fmds it 
predictable that the executive and legislative branches would breach and 
circumvent the holding in Chadha. After describing some of the post-
Chadha arrangements b~:tween agencies and their oversight commit-
tees,29 Fisher concludes that "[n]either branch wants the static model of 
separated powers offered by the Court. The inevitable result is a record 
of noncompliance, subtle ~~vasion, and a system oflawmak.ing that is now 
more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than before."30 
Fisher's discussion of fourth amendment issues exemplifies how 
Congress and the Court can work in concert to develop constitutional 
standards.31 The Court has recognized explicitly that its fourth amend-
20. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867) (discussed at pp. 218-19). 
21. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (discussed at p. 18). 
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (discussed at pp. 28-29). 
23. See pp. 122-23 (detailing :.etters sent in 1793 by Supreme Court Justices to Congress about 
the physical hardships of ridipg ·circuit). 
24. Seep. 175 (describing r~.ssignment of a Texas "white primary" case from Justice Frank-
furter, a Vienna-born Jew, to Justtce Reed, a Kentucky Democrat). 
25. See pp. 30-36. 
26. The ability to bring forward new and useful information is Fisher's trademark. See gener-
ally L. FlSHER, CONSTITUUONAl CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1985) 
(containing an historical overview of constitutional controversies involving Congress and the execu-
tive); L. FlSHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the relationship be-
tween Congress and the executive in the context of recent events). 
27. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
28. P. 224. Under the legisla1:ive veto, agencies were able to act in the absence oflegislation and 
Congress was able to disapprove of such action without sending legislation to the President. 
29. Pp. 225-27; see also Not·~. Congressional Oversight Through Legislative Veto After INS v. 
Chadha, 69 CoRNELL L. REV. 1244, 1262-66 (1984) (discussing the effect of Chadha on several 
categories of existing legislative V•!to provisions). 
30. P. 228. 
31. See generally pp. 255-70. 
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ment decisions "do[ ] not prevent or advise against legislative or execu-
tive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible 
abuses of the search warrant procedure."32 Consequently, Congress 
passed legislation to prohibit the third-party searches of newspapers33 
that the Court upheld in the Stanford Daily case. 34 Although describing 
the evolution of this bill as an "intricate dance" between Congress and 
the courts, Fisher concludes that "Congress performed the identical task 
attempted by the Court-balancing the Fourth Amendment against 
other interests-and reached a strikingly different conclusion."35 
The Congressional responses to Chadha and Stanford Daily both 
demonstrate the critical role played by nonjudicial actors in defining the 
Constitution. By combining studies such as these with other anecdotal 
information, Fisher succeeds both in holding the reader's interest and in 
amassing a large body of information revealing the political sensibilities 
of the judiciary and the constitutional responsibilities of the elected 
branches. 
III. The Consequences of Three-Branch Interpretation 
Fisher's detail work is not extraneous to the debate over the appro-
priate role of the elected branches in constitutional interpretation. Be-
cause legislative and executive action influence constitutional decision 
making, caution should guide those who support the abdication of inter-
pretive responsibilities by the elected branches. Heat should be put on-
not taken off-all parties engaging in constitutional dialogues. To do 
otherwise would promote irresponsible constitutional interpretation. 
Scholarship in this area generally focuses either on the institutional 
competence of the branches or on the propriety of nonjudicial constitu-
tional interpretation. 36 Commentators pay little attention to the more 
32. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978) (discussed at pp. 255-57). 
33. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5 to -7, 2000aa-11 to -12 (1982)). 
34. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 550-53. 
35. P. 257. 
36. See, e.g., J. AGRESfO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984) 
(examining judicial review in light of history and constitutional theory and arguing that constitu-
tional deliberation should not be the exclusive province of the courts); J. CHOPER, JuDICIAL RE-
VIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS 169-380 (1980) (arguing that the political process 
and separation of powers make judicial review inappropriate for certain constitutional issues); 
Hickok, The Framers' Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA. L. REv. 
217, 217 (1986) (arguing that framers intended Congressional deliberation on constitutional issues); 
Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 366, 367 (1984) (proposing a comparative institutional analysis that the Supreme 
Court could use to decide which branch of government should decide a particular constitutional 
issue); Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REv. 977-1095 
(1987) (Attorney General Meese's speech and reactions from scholars); The Federalist Society Sixth 
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mundane concerns of asse~:sing the quality of nonjudicial interpreta-
tions37 or offering proposal~: for improving dialogues between the three 
branches.38 ·Correlatively, seholars give little play to political considera-
tions that may well influence judicial action.39 To be sure, there are ex-
ceptions. Paul Brest has recently written both about the consequences of 
our faulty assumption "that only the Court is authorized to decide, or is 
capable of deciding, constitutional questions"40 and about Congress's 
power-based on an evalua1ion of its performance-to oppose Court in-
terpretations.41 Walter Murphy and others have prepared a casebook 
that deals in large part with the question, "Who may authoritatively in-
terpret the Constitution?"42 Overall, however, scholars consider the 
Constitution to be the courts' possession. 
Fisher's chronicling of three-branch interj>retation debunks this per-
ception. Fisher's work, however, is not without its shortcomings. First, 
if Fisher had used more extensive case studies, Constitutional Dialogues 
might have offered a richer understanding of three-branch interpretation. 
Second, Fisher pays insufficient attention to the quality of nonjudicial 
interpretation and fails to offer sugges~ions for its improvement. 
Detailed case studies provide the best device for understanding how 
the elected branches and the states engage in constitutional dialogues 
with the Supreme Court. They help to place judicial and nonjudicial 
action in context by focusing attention on the nature of the dialogue be-
tween branches and levels of government. Constitutional Dialogues pur-
posefully avoids this appmach. Fisher's concern is the reality, not the 
operation, of three-branch interpretation. The author drives home this 
Annual Symposium on Law and Public Policy, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 281, 371-400 (1988) (panel on 
the role of the legislative and executive branches in interpreting the Constitution). 
37. But see Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial 
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 82-101 (1986) (discussing examples of legislation and concluding that 
Congress has no tradition of constitutional deliberation and no procedures for routinely reviewing 
the constitutionality of legislation); Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 
N.C.L. REv. 707, 731-34 (1985) (reviewing legislation that Congress passed only after concluding, 
with good reason, that it would be constitutional); Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and 
Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 587, 587 (1983) (discussing legislation and concluding that 
Congress does not thoroughly review the constitutionality of legislation it passes). 
38. Cf Devins, Bob Jones University v. United States: A Political Analysis, 1 J.L. & PoL. 403, 
420 (1984) (interpreting the Bob Jones decision in light of related legislative and executive action). 
39. Cf Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 585, 601 (1975) (failing to address "the practical problems that confront a legislator whose 
constitutional obligations conflict with the political demands of his office"). 
40. Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 175, 175 (1986). In Brest's view, 
·~udicial exclusivity" is problematic both because some issues never come before courts and because 
courts-when they do consider constitutional issues-often defer to the legislature's judgment. I d. 
at 181. 
41. Brest, supra note 37, at 10:1-05. 
42. See W. MURPHY, J. Fl.EM['o!G & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 185-284 (1986). 
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central concern through a collage of snapshot portrayals of nonjudicial 
interpretation. 
This technique, however, does not detail fully the complexity and 
pervasiveness of these dialogues. Volleys between the elected branches 
and the courts cannot be summarized neatly in two or three pages, for 
such exchanges often take place in many phases. For example, on the 
issue of tax exemptions for discriminatory private schools, the three 
branches exchanged legislation, judicial opinions, and administrative 
proposals for four successive years.43 The state, executive, and legislative 
responses to Roe v. Wade are even more striking. Congress has repeat-
edly tackled the abortion issue. On the one hand, it has rejected efforts 
to defme life at conception44 and to curtail federal court jurisdiction in 
this area. 45 On the other hand, it has accepted restrictions on federal 
abortion funding46 and has funded pro-life counseling programs. 47 The 
executive branch likewise has been extremely active in its attempts to 
regulate abortion. It has participated in numerous lawsuits in this area48 
' and has made Planned Parenthood and other abortion-related activities 
the frequent subject of regulation.49 Finally, a vigorous dialogue has 
emerged between state legislatures and the federal courts. The legisla-
tures constantly enact, review, and modify laws governing such areas as 
pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, and juvenile and spousal 
43. See Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitations Riders, 1987 DUKE 
L.J. 456, 488-99. This controversy centered on statutory-not constitutional-interpretation. Yet 
the dynamic interplay between all three branches is at least as significant in the statutory context as 
it is with constitutional issues. Indeed, Fisher's thesis would apply with equal force to a study of 
statutory interpretation. Fisher recognizes this phenomenon. Pp. 206-09. For a provocative explo-
ration into whether public attitudes should shape statutory construction, see Eskridge, Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987). 
44. See The Human Life Bill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-24 (1981) (text and revised text of bill (S. 158) to 
define human life as beginning at conception). 
45. H.R. 80, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985). 
46. See Devins, supra note 43, at 466-68, 485-87. 
47. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2566-67 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of 
statute that provided grants to religious and other institutions that furnished counseling on adoles-
cent premarital sexual relations and did not promote abortion). 
48. See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 473 U.S. 931, 931 (1985) 
(mem.) (denying Acting Solicitor General's motion for leave to participate in oral argument with 
respect to the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute regnlating abortions); Reproductive Health 
Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585, 596 n.21 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare's amicus brief before district court cited United States Attorney General opinion 
letter stating that abortion was not recognized medical treatment, pursuant to the Hyde Amend-
ment, for victims of rape or incest). 
49. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 2944 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(9)(1)) (providing that 
family planning projects receiving certain federal funds cannot provide abortion referrals or "provide 
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning"). 
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rights. 5° Full-blown case studies would have provided the best look at 
these constitutional dialogues. 
Furthermore, an assessment of nonjudicial interpretation also would 
have improved Constitutional Dialogues. Fisher tells us that "if we count 
the times that Congress has been 'wrong' about the Constitution and 
compare those lapses with the occasions when the Court has been 
'wrong' by its own later admissions, the results make a compelling case 
for legislative confidence and judicial modesty."51 Aside from noting one 
occasion on which Congress responded more quickly to ill-considered 
legislation than the Court responded to an ill-considered decision,52 
Fisher provides little authority to back up this claim. Moreover, Fisher 
offers neither assessment nor review of the quality of state and executive 
interpretations. 
This omission is unfortunate. Once convinced that Fisher's depic-
tion of three-branch interpretation is accurate, the reader hungers for 
both some qualitatiye analysis and a prognosis for the future. In light of 
widespread doubts over nonjudicial competence, the need for such an 
assessment is acute. Recent articles by Judge Abner Mikva and Dean 
Paul Brest have contended that legislative debate "does not explore the 
constitutional implications of pending legislation; and, at best, Congress 
does an uneven job of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it 
adopts."53 Mere assertions. of legislative competence do not adequately 
dispel these concerns. 
· The inclusion of an extended case study and an assessment of nonju-
dicial interpretation would have improved this fme book. These omis-
sions, moreover, are surprising. Fisher's recent scholarship (portions of 
which he incorporates into the book) includes both a case study of legis-
lative-judicial dialogues on the fourth amendment54 and a positive assess-
ment of constitutional interpretation by Congress. 55 
IV. The Supreme Court'8 Promotion of Three-Branch Interpretation 
The role played by nonjudicial interpretations in the shaping of con-
stitutional law tells only part of the story. Constitutional Dialogues also 
50. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 15-10 (2d ed. 1988) (survey-
ing governmental regulation of a person's decision about procreation). 
51. P. 274. 
52. P. 274. 
53. Mikva, supra note 37, at 587; see also Brest, supra note 37, at 82-101 (concluding that 
Congress has no tradition of constitutional deliberation and no procedures for routinely reviewing 
the constitutionality of legislation). 
54. Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REv. 107 (1986). 
55. Fisher, supra note 37. This article considers both institutional competence and actual per-
formance. See id. at 717-43. 
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acknowledges that Supreme Court rulings play a fundamental role in 
three-branch interpretation. Fisher's text reflects the importance of the 
Supreme Court's role in sections concerning fourth and fifth amendment 
rights, threshold requirements, Younger abstention, and Congress's 
power to enforce the reconstruction amendments. In each of these areas, 
Fisher shows that the Court polices itself when deciding issues of concern 
to the elected branches and the states. For the most part, these analyses 
do not implicate substantive doctrine. Fisher focuses instead on jurisdic-
tional authority. 56 
One could extend this analysis, for these concerns pervade all consti-
tutional decision making. Judicial review, threshold requirements, com-
merce, separation of powers, due process, and equality all fundamentally 
concern the existence and scope of federal judicial authority as it relates 
to the prerogatives of the elected branches and the states. 
Consider the equality guarantee. Traditional equal protection re-
view of social and economic legislation presumes legislative supremacy. 
Williams v. Lee Optical Co. 57 and Railway Express Agency v. New York 58 
reveal the Court's willingness to impute legitimating rationales to seem-
ingly arbitrary classifications. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 59 
and United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 60 emphasize that 
the Court will overlook incorrect legislative fact-finding and suspect leg-
islative purposes provided the legislature's stated rationale is legitimate. 
Discussion of these cases raises-in Judge Posner's words-the question 
of whether "[t]he real 'justification' for most legislation is simply that it 
is the product of the constitutionally created political process of our 
society."61 
Heightened-scrutiny equal protection review raises similar concerns. 
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer62 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
56. Congressional enforcement of the Civil War amendments and fourth and fifth amendment 
rights are substantive concerns. Fisher's treatment of these matters, however, emphasizes proce-
dural aspects. With respect to civil rights enforcement, Fisher's principle concern is the Supreme 
Court's recognition that "[f]actfmding [in this area] was a legislative, not a judicial responsibility." 
P. 270. On fourth and fifth amendment matters, Fisher seeks to demonstrate the truth of Henry 
Monaghan's assertion that "what appears to be constitutional interpretation by the courts is some-
times 'a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and 
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional com-
mon law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.' " P. 269 (quoting 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975)). 
57. 348 u.s. 483 (1955). 
58. 336 u.s. 106 (1949). 
59. 449 u.s. 456 (1981). 
60. 449 u.s. 166 (1980). 
61. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial 
Minorities, 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 29. 
62. 440 u.s. 568 (1978). 
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Living Center 63 show the Court's reluctance over the past decade to ex-
tend the list of suspect classifications. An underlying concern of these 
decisions-especially in light of the Court's willingness to contort ra-
tional basis review in egregious cases64-is the preservation of legislative 
prerogatives. The Court's ':reatment of racial and sexual discrimination 
allegations, to which heightened scrutiny applies, is equally striking. The 
predominant discriminatory motive requirement65 and the difficulty of 
making such a showing66 reveal a strong preference for upholding legisla-
tive judgments. 
Finally, the power of Congress and the states to remedy discrimina-
tion shows the Court's desire to validate legislative action. Cases inter-
preting section 5 of the fourteenth amendment consider Congress's 
power and capacity supreme. As the Court stated in Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 67 "It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or fed-
eral, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in 
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and 
authority to enforce equal. protection guarantees." Affirmative action 
cases such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 68 recognize that the 
state may voluntarily remedy discrimination without garnering evidence 
comparable to that which a court would need to order race-conscious 
action. 
Equality jurisprudence reveals how substantive doctrine can further 
an understanding of the :role played by the elected branches and the 
states in constitutional doctrine. Greater recognition of the concerns un-
derlying the Court's support of legislative preferences would have 
strengthened Fisher's arguments. At the same time, Fisher's basic criti-
cism remains true. The role played by other parts of government in con-
stitutional interpretation cannot be understood solely through case law. 
63. 473 u.s. 432 (1985). 
64. In Cleburne Living Center, for example, the Court, after holding that the mentally retarded 
are not a suspect class, closely scrutinized a zoning ordinance that adversely affected the mentally 
retarded. See id. at 455-68 (Marshall, J., concurring) (demonstrating the Court's misapplication of 
the rational basis standard). 
65. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (upholding police screening test 
under equal protection challenge b1:cause of employer's lack of intent to discriminate despite test's 
disproportionate racial impact). 
66. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1763-70 (1987) (rejecting petitioner's argument 
that study showing black defendants sentenced to death with greater frequency than white defend-
ants proved discriminatory motive); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256,257-80 (1979) (holding 
that state hiring preference for vet·~rans was not intentionally discriminatory against women even 
though 98% of veterans were men). 
67. 448 u.s. 448, 483 (1980). 
68. 476 U.S. 267, 284-94 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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V. Conclusion 
Constitutional Dialogues makes a convincing argument for the inclu-
sion of non-case materials in the basic constitutional law class. Nonjudi-
cial interpretation and influence on interpretation are simply too 
important to be excluded. Constitutional law casebooks, however, pay 
scant attention to three-branch interpretation. 69 Bemoaning this short-
sightedness, Fisher argues that "'there is no comprehensive course on 
constitutional law in any meaningful sense in American law schools.' " 70 
Fisher is quite correct that "[a] purely technical approach to the law 
misses the constant, creative interplay between the judiciary and the 
political system."71 Limiting a course to a handful of substantive areas 
such as judicial review, separation of powers, equality, and speech does 
not permit a systematic study of the workings of the Court as an institu-
tion. Although a professor can combat this limitation by considering 
either a decision's social context or the relationship between doctrinal 
inconsistencies arid social realities, one can extend a course only so far 
beyond case moorings. 
More significantly, Fisher perceives that law professors' geocentric 
understandings of the Constitution will yield an inaccurate portrayal of 
constitutional decision making. Although law professors might do a bet-
ter job than Fisher suspects, the case method does not promote Fisher's 
view of three-branch interpretation. 
Professors should not limit courses in constitutional law and other 
subjects to cases and related doctrinal commentary. Other disciplines 
can contribute substantially to legal education. As Douglas Laycock re-
cently observed, "if history, political theory, economics, literary criti-
cism, or Mayan glyphs are important to a course, we need not be limited 
to the information we can tuck into notes on the cases."72 For Laycock, 
replacing substantial case materials with expository text on related sub-
jects would accommodate this concern. 73 This methodology would en-
able students to study both cases and related activities of the elected 
branches. Granted, doctrinal headings would still defme the exploration, 
but such an approach would allay Fisher's basic concerns. Whether this 
approach would work well in law students' first year, when the develop-
69. See p. 4 n.3. 
70. P. 4 (quoting Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of 
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.l3 (1984)). See generally pp. 3-6. 
71. P. 4. 
72. Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and Evolutionary 
Changes in Casebooks (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REv. 1642, 1654 (1988) (reviewing J. NooNAN, 
THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE (1987)). 
73. /d. at 1654-55. 
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ment of case-analysis skills is crucial, is another question. Yet legal edu-
cators can and should take some steps in this direction. 74 
The simple truth, as Fisher puts it, is that "[c]ourt decisions are 
entitled to respect, not adoration."75 Constitutional Dialogues' forthright 
presentation of nonjudicial influences and interpretations lays an excel-
lent groundwork for expanding our understanding of constitutional in-
terpretations. It is an excellent primer for those involved in 
constitutional dialogues-namely, everyone. 
74. At the least, professors can use selections from works such as Constitutional Dialogues to 
supplement the judicial authority unit of the basic constitutional law class. I have done this, and-as 
best I can tell-my students appreciate Fisher's broadening perspective. 
75. P. 279. 
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What Appeals to the Court 
FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE. By Michael E. 
Tigar.t Colorado Springs: Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1987. 
Pp. xvii, 436. $85.00.t 
Reviewed by Alvin B. Rubin* 
Moot court judges grade advocates. Court of appeals judges decide 
cases. The difference is vast. As Lawrence M. Friedman wrote, "There 
are many brilliant lawyers who argue magnificently in front of the 
Supreme Court. They mostly lose. The Justices are stubborn and 
intelligent."1 
Experienced judges and lawyers know, however, that the skill of an 
advocate sometimes does determine a decision. In order to have even a 
chance to influence a court, an advocate must first follow the rules of 
appellate jurisdiction and practice. Only then can forensic skill play its 
part. The utility of a book by an experienced appellate advocate that not 
only details the procedure to be followed but also instructs on effective 
presentation is therefore obvious. 
Many lawyers view appellate advocacy as their clients do. When 
preparing a brief, belying its name, they write a lengthy exegesis, finally 
abridging it to meet the fifty-page maximum limit Their oral argument 
is courtroom oratory better adapted to the ears of a jury. Professor 
Michael Tigar instructs just as Piero Calamandrei observes in his Eulogy 
of Judges: 
What constitutes a great lawyer? He is a man who helps the judge 
reach a just decision and helps his client present his case. 
Such a lawyer speaks no more than is necessary; he writes 
clearly and to the point; he does not encumber the courtroom with 
his personality. He does not bore the judges with his prolixity nor 
raise their suspicions with his subtlety. For all practical purposes, 
then, he is the opposite of that type whom many laymen consider 
the great lawyer.2 
t Thomas Watt Gregory Professor in Law & Joseph D. Jamail Centennial Chair in Law, The 
University of Texas School of Law. 
t Hereinafter cited by page, section, or chapter number only. 
• Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
I. Friedman, Justices in Black and White, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, § 7 (Book Review Sec-
tion), at 18, col. 1 (reviewing L. BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 
(1984)). 
2. P. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 59 (J. Adams & C. Phillips trans. 1942). 
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Tigar gained most of his appellate experience before becoming a full-
time law professor, but he has continued to brief and argue cases during 
his teaching career. In most of his cases, a federal court appoints him to 
serve as counsel pro bono. Tigar uses some of these cases as grist for a 
seminar on federal appellate advocacy, and his law students assist in pre-
paring the cases. He takes on other cases as retained counsel. Federal 
Appeals: Jurisdiction and Practice is a distillation of what Tigar has 
learned in two decades of appellate advocacy. · 
Other lawyers have treated us in recent years to a spate of similar 
volumes.3 Professor Tigar's contribution is not only the latest but also 
one of the most useful for the: lawyer who takes or defends an appeal in a 
federal court of appeals. 
Although the opening chapter of Tigar's book deals with "The Art, 
Science, and Tactics of Appellate Advocacy," he devotes most of the re-
maining text to reviewing appellate court rules and providing how-to-do-
it instruction. He discusses with accuracy and clarity appealable orders, 
extraordinary writs, where to appeal, whether to take an appeal, and pro-
ceedings in district court, tax court, and before agencies. 4 Tigar then 
reviews the handling of the record in the court of appeals, motion prac-
tice, the various briefs, oral argument, the courts' decisional process, and 
finally, rehearings.5 
Much of this discussion is elementary but, like other fundamentals, 
indispensable. Specialists in appellate advocacy are rare. Of the rela-
tively few lawyers who ever appear in a federal appeals court, only a 
small percentage handle even one appellate case a year. A very few, most 
of them assistant U.S. attorneys, appear more frequently. No one can be 
expert in the details of some:thing done only occasionally. A guidebook 
is therefore invaluable not only to the beginner, but also to those with 
limited appellate experience. 
Tigar's chapter on writing briefs includes hints about organizing its 
text, using a notebook to assemble material ("the notebook theory," as he 
calls it), and using a word processor. 6 These suggestions are useful, for 
they are practical. The ultimate test, however, is the quality of the prod-
3. E.g., M. FONTHAM, WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1985); J. GAUBATZ, THE MOOT 
COURT BOOK (1979); R. GiVENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAUSE (2d ed. 1980); A. 
HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL (1984); R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION 
(1985); R. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1987); 
R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE APPEALS (1983); E. RE, 
BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT (6th ed. 1987); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1981); F. WEINER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967). 
4. Chs. 2-6. 
5. Chs. 7-11. 
6. Ch. 9. 
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uct in a lawyer's attempt to fashion an argument that will lead a court to 
the result the advocate seeks. 
Tigar writes, "[A]n appellate brief is often a win or lose document."7 
It therefore may seem to some readers that Tigar stresses the brief too 
much. Not so. The importance of an effective, well-prepared brief can-
not be overemphasized. As Tigar notes, judges read the briefs before 
they hear counsel;8 indeed, almost every federal appellate judge does so 
conscientiously, for a judge's lack of preparation quickly becomes evident 
to the other members of a panel, if not to counsel. Those few judges who 
have not turned the pages of the briefs will have bench memos from law 
clerks, who will have read them. It is inevitable, therefore, that prior to 
oral argument the judges will have formed some impression about the 
merits of the appeal and the cogency of the arguments, even though most 
judges maintain open minds on the fmal result. Furthermore, a few days 
or months after oral argument, when judges begin to prepare opinions, 
most turn once again to the briefs. As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote: 
Regardless of the panel you get, the questions you get, or the an-
swers you give, I maintain it is the brief that does the final job, if 
for no other reason than that opinions are often written several 
weeks and sometimes months after argument. The arguments, 
great as they may have been, are forgotten. In the seclusion of his 
chambers the judge has only the briefs and the law books. At that 
time your brief is your only spokesman.9 
Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure10 requires a 
lawyer to begin his brief with a table of contents followed by a statement 
of the issues presented for review. The latter should give the court a 
clear and self-explanatory resume of the issues raised on appeal. Instead, 
as Tigar notes, "[fjar too many brief writers fall into one of two errors: 
(1) they reproduce the headings from the body of the brief; or (2) they 
state the issue in terms so general as to be useless." 11 Others make a 
third and equally common error: they state the issue so narrowly that its 
meaning is obscure to anyone who is not already familiar with the case. I 
therefore have often read an appellant's statement of the issues without 
having any clear idea of what the real issues are or how they arose. A 
statement of issues should tell the court exactly what the appeal is about. 
The question "Did the trial court err in holding that the 180-day period 
for filing a title VII suit is not subject to waiver or estoppel?" tells me 
7. P. 224. 
8. Pp. 224-25. 
9. Marshall, The Federal Appeal, in COUNSEL ON APPEAL 139, 146 (A. Charpentier ed. 1968). 
10. FED. R. APP. P. 28; see also sec. 9.08 (arguing that advocates should write very specific 
statements of issues presented). 
11. P. 239. 
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exactly what the issue is. "Did the trial court err in its instruction on the 
elements of the crime of m;ing the mails to defraud?" does not. The lat-
ter question does not tell me what the court charged or why that charge 
allegedly was deficient. 
Next comes a "statement of the case," including a "statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review." 12 As my late colleague 
Albert Tate, Jr. once wrote·, "The statement of facts is regarded by many 
advocates and judges as the most important part of the brief."13 Tigar 
correctly notes that the statement of the case is the "most difficult part of 
the brief to craft,"14 and, in my experience, the statement of facts is also 
the weakest part of most briefs. The factual account should be narrative 
and in chronological order, with ample citations to the parts of the rec-
ord that support the accotmt. As Tigar notes, ''The statement must be 
coherent, in the sense that the narrative flows from beginning to end."15 
He further emphasizes that "the advocate must seek the thematic unity 
and clarity that characterize a good opening statement. " 16 It must be 
"both accurate and filled with helpful citations to the record!' 17 With all 
of this I agree, and add that the statement of facts should distinguish 
clearly what is undisputed from what is contradicted. It should not be a 
partisan view of what the evidence might mean if construed wholly fa-
vorably in every respect to the counsel's position. 
The good advocate will ask a nonlawyer spouse or friend to read not 
only the statement of issm!S and the statement of the case but also the 
entire brief to see if it is cle:ar and comprehensible. If an intelligent non-
lawyer does not understand the issues, a sentence in the brief, or the 
significance of an argument, a judge likewise may fail to comprehend. 
In di~cussing brief writing and the preparation of an appendix or 
record excerpts, Tigar state:s that before oral argument, the full record is 
"available to the judges and their law clerks. Few judges take the time to 
read it, and most do not c::ven have their law clerks do so .... " 18 I 
emphasize that judges and law clerks rarely take the time to read the 
record before oral argument. The record is filed in the clerk of court's 
office. After argument, as Tigar points out, the opinion is assigned to a 
judge. The clerk of court s·;:nds the record to that judge's chambers. Af-
12. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(3). 
13. Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Hear, LITIGATION, Winter 1978, at 
11, 14. 
14. P. 242. 
15. P. 243. 
16. P. 244. 
17. P. 245. 
18. Pp. 24546. 
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ter the judge prepares a proposed opinion, the other panel members usu-
ally read only that opinion. If they agree with the proposed opinion, they 
concur. A panel member will ordinarily ask the writing judge to send the 
record to her chambers only if, after reading the draft, she has a different 
view of what the record may contain and how the case should be decided. 
The moral, of course, is that the briefs and record summary must tell the 
judges all that counsel wishes them to know before they hear oral argu-
ment and before they reach at least a tentative decision. 
Tigar's discussion of the next step, preparing for oral argument, 19 is 
particularly helpful. Although he states that "the final step [in prepara-
tion] is to practice the argument,"20 I would stress further that rehearsal 
is indispensable and ought to be universal. The best rehearsal is before a 
panel of three lawyers who have read the briefs and who can serve as a 
moot court. John P. Frank, a distinguished advocate,21 once told me 
that his firm presents no case to any appellate court, state or federal, 
until it has been thus argued in the office. "Is that time donated?" I 
asked. "Of course not," he answered. "It's billed to the client. That's 
just as important as time spent writing the brief." "What," I inquired, 
"about pro bono cases?" He replied, "We do the same thing, because it's 
an integral part of any preparation." 
The lawyer who does not have three fellow lawyers who will partici-
pate will find it almost as valuable to argue before a spouse or a friend. It 
is useful in either event to record the practice argument with a video-
camera and review it. 
Although Tigar apparently intended his work to be a basic guide 
rather than a commentary, I would have welcomed a broader examina-
tion of the federal appellate process containing more analysis, commen-
tary, and criticism. The rules about what constitutes an appealable order 
create a continuing problem, and uncertainty about when a litigant may 
take an appeal causes repeated litigation and unnecessary expense. 22 The 
rule about the time within which a party must file an appeal is apparently 
clear, but it may create a trap for counsel.23 I would welcome sugges-
19. Ch. 10. 
20. P. 272. 
21. Mr. Frank served as a law clerk to Justice Hugo Black and taught at Yale Law School. For 
more than 30 years, he has practiced in Phoenix, Arizona, as a partner in a major law firm. He is a 
member of the Council of the American Law Institute and has been active in the American Bar 
Association. 
22. See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1952 (1988) (holding that claims of 
immunity and forum n9n conveniens are not immediately appealable). 
23. See, e.g., Alcorn Elec. Exch., Inc. v. Burgess, 849 F.2d 964, 966 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving 
counsel who filed notice of appeal before a final issue was resolved and failed to file further notice); 
Harcon Barge, Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, 784 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (involving 
counsel who failed to file further notice of appeal after opposing party moved to amend judgment). 
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tions for changes in the statutes, rules, and decisions on these and other 
problematic subjects. 
A supplement, containing citations to later decisions and amplifying 
comments in the book, is already being prepared. Even in the matter of 
appellate procedure, developments come apace. The careful advocate 
will not only read the supplement but will continue research to discover 
even later decisions. 
I have mentioned some areas in which Tigar's excellent book might 
have been even better. My final measure of it, however, is this: I wish 
that every lawyer who ever expects to participate in an appeal to the 
Fifth Circuit would read a copy and then, when the time comes to pre-
pare for an appeal, would reread it and use it as a guide. The lawyer 
would benefit by reducing the possibility of harmful error or embarrass-
ment and by enhancing hi8 chances of success. And we judges also 
would benefit, for the better the advocates, the easier the judges' task and 
the better the resulting opinion. Good advocates help judges to make 
better decisions. 
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